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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Orbán’s Invincibility 
is Over
Municipal Elections in Hungary
Regional elections were held in Hunga-
ry on October 13, 2019. Viktor Orbán’s 
Fidesz party preserved its dominance 
over regional assemblies as well as 
most rural towns and villages. Mean-
while, a united opposition managed to 
take control of 10 of 23 Hungarian cit-
ies, including 14 of 23 districts in Bu-
dapest – enabling it to determine the 
capital’s lord mayor. Although these 
developments mark the end of Orbán’s 
decade-long invincibility, they do not 
necessarily pave the way to opposition 
success in national elections scheduled 
for 2022.
STEPS TOWARD A 
UNITED OPPOSITION
For a decade, opposition parties in 
Hungary have ranged from the far 
right to the liberal left. This fragmen-
tation has enabled the ruling party, 
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, to dominate the 
political landscape – particularly since 
it reshaped electoral law in its own fa-
vor and established unprecedentedly 
strong control over the country’s me-
dia. In Hungarian parliamentary elec-
tions held in spring 2018, Fidesz se-
cured a constitutional majority for the 
third time in a row while opposition 
parties failed to unite their forces.
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PARAMETERS 
OF HUNGARIAN 
MUNICIPAL 
ELECTIONS
In their municipal elections, 
Hungarians elect mayors and 
local governments for 3,177 
settlements – including Buda-
pest – as well as assemblies for 
the country’s 19 counties. The 
most politically relevant levels 
of municipal elections are:
 – The lord mayor and city 
council of Budapest
 – Local governments for 
Budapest’s 23 districts
 – Mayors and local gov-
ernments for the 23 
Hungarian cities with 
county rights
 – Assemblies for the  
country’s 19 counties
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This devastating 2018 defeat, howev-
er, turned out to be a catalyst for op-
position forces to change their strate-
gy. Since early 2019, negotiations were 
held to nominate joint candidates for 
the local elections in October. Europe-
an Parliamentary elections held in May 
2019 provided additional impetus for 
reshuffling the opposition. Their re-
sults convinced all parties of the ne-
cessity to cooperate – even those that 
had previously ruled it out.
By the municipal elections of October 
2019, opposition parties had managed 
to nominate single, jointly-supported 
mayoral candidates in almost all 46 of 
Hungary’s larger districts and cities – 
along with further such candidates in a 
handful of smaller settlements.
THE ELECTION RESULTS
On the basis of data, both Fidesz and 
the opposition have plenty of grounds 
to claim victories in October 2019’s 
municipal elections. On the one hand, 
opposition gains in certain settlements 
constitute a considerable break-
through, especially compared to very 
moderate expectations. On the other, 
Fidesz gained many more votes than it 
had received in the municipal elections 
of 2014. In order to understand these 
seemingly contradictory results, de-
tailed examination is needed.
By cooperating more effectively in the 
October 2019 elections than they ever 
had, opposition forces managed to se-
cure more mayoral seats. In almost all 
of Budapest’s 23 districts and Hunga-
ry’s 23 biggest towns, opposition forc-
es fielded a joint mayoral candidate. In 
comparison, in most places in 2014’s 
elections, several opposition candi-
dates competed for each seat, result-
ing in vote fragmentation that benefit-
ted Fidesz.
Since 2006, the opposition had not 
fielded a candidate for lord mayor of 
Budapest, whom voters believed to be 
capable of defeating an opponent affil-
iated with Fidesz. The fact that such a 
lord mayoral candidate was fielded in 
2019 was not only a boost for opposi-
tion campaigns in all of Budapest’s dis-
tricts, but it also had a nationwide ef-
fect as well. Although many – mainly 
in larger towns – viewed the munici-
pal elections as an anti-Orbán refer-
endum, the opposition also managed 
to reach out to those voters who cast 
their ballots for candidates offering 
answers to local issues. 
The opposition understood that – due 
to Fidesz’ dominance of the media and 
the opposition’s lack of access to pub-
lic advertising space – it only had two 
remaining channels to reach its vot-
ers: social media and, more important-
ly, face-to-face campaigns. Hence, op-
position parties concentrated their 
efforts on these two fields. Local cam-
paign teams, who were recruited from 
different opposition parties, worked 
with remarkable eff iciency. When 
comparing October 2019’s regional 
elections to those of 2014, the opposi-
Fidesz or
Fidesz-aliated
Opposition
Before 
the election
After
the election
Number of mandates in Budapest’s city council 
Mayors in 23 Budapest districts
Mayors in 23 cities with county rights
13
17
6 14
19
4
13
10
20(incl. Lord Mayor István Tarlós)
18 (incl. Lord Mayor Gergely Karácsony)
15 (incl. 2 independents supported by Fidesz)
9 (incl. 2 independents supported by Fidesz)
(incl. 1 independent 
supported by Fidesz)
Figure 1: The political landscape after the 2019 municipal election in Hungary
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tion mobilized more new voters than 
Fidesz.
Last but not least, the sex and corrup-
tion scandal surrounding Zsolt Borkai, 
mayor of the northwestern city of 
Győr, certainly encouraged turn out 
among anti-Orbán voters, although 
the exact effect of the scandal cannot 
be quantified.
Together, all of these factors led to the 
transformation of the political land-
scape described in Figure 1.
FIDESZ DID NOT 
BECOME WEAKER
Nevertheless, Fidesz’s performance 
was impressive, especially when com-
pared to previous elections. The party 
still does not seem to have a challeng-
er in smaller settlements, and it even 
managed to gain new voters in larger 
cities and the capital. 
The aggregated share of votes received 
by Fidesz on county lists improved to 
57.2 percent in 2019 from 52.6 percent 
in 2014. Considering how dominant 
the party already was in 2014, this is a 
massive improvement. It must be not-
ed that voters living in the capital and 
the 23 cities with county rights do not 
vote for these county lists Thus, these 
data illustrate the power of Fidesz in 
smaller settlements – which, however, 
still cover the larger part of Hungary.
Contrary to popular belief, it is not 
true that Fidesz is only strong in small 
rural settlements. In fact, over a third 
of the party’s voters live in the capi-
tal and larger cities. In the parliamen-
tary elections of 2018, opposition can-
didates triumphed in two-thirds of 
Budapest’s single-member-constitu-
encies; moreover, they could have won 
100 percent had they fielded a joint 
candidate in all of them. But this suc-
cess for the opposition did not stop Fi-
desz from gaining a two-thirds majori-
ty in parliament in 2018. Had there also 
been a municipal election that year, Fi-
desz likely would have lost most Bu-
dapest districts. Nevertheless, in Oc-
tober 2019 – only one and a half years 
later – Fidesz won 9 of 23 of Budapest’s 
districts, which can well be interpret-
ed as a solid improvement. Moreover, 
there were mayoral candidates fielded 
by Fidesz in several larger cities who 
gained significantly more votes in Oc-
tober 2019 than they did in the previ-
ous local elections. This time, they only 
failed to win because of the more ef-
fective cooperation between opposi-
tional parties.
While the fact that the opposition won 
10 cities out of the largest 23 is im-
pressive at first glance, it also indi-
cates that a joint candidate per se is 
not enough for a complete victory. 
If we consider that, in 2018’s general 
election, opposition candidates gained 
more votes than Fidesz candidates in 
21 out of these 23 cities, the opposi-
tion’s achievements in 2019’s municipal 
elections no longer seem that remark-
able. These data indicate that voter de-
cisions are not only influenced by par-
ty sympathies, but also by whether 
people believe in the effectiveness of 
both mayoral and parliamentary can-
didates on a local level – and wheth-
er people believe that opposition can-
didates can actually beat competitors 
affiliated with Fidesz. 
THE WAY FORWARD
The local elections held on October 
13, 2019 marked the end of a decade 
in which Viktor Orbán’s party could 
win all national, regional, and Euro-
pean Parliamentary elections. Though 
the ruling party managed to preserve 
control over the countryside, the loss 
of Budapest and ten major cities is un-
doubtedly a serious blow.
Though the election results can be in-
terpreted in different ways – both the 
opposition and Fidesz can claim them-
selves as winners – one thing has cer-
tainly changed: the myth of Fidesz’s 
invincibility is broken. Both pro- and 
anti-Orbán voters can see clear chanc-
es for Fidesz’s defeat, even at the par-
liamentary level. This psychological 
and symbolic effects of this shift can-
not be overestimated. 
However, it is still too early to draw 
any far-reaching conclusions for the 
next parliamentary election, which is 
scheduled for spring 2022. The oppo-
sition’s cooperation strategy for this 
election is not yet ready – particular-
ly because Hungary has a mixed elec-
tion system, composed of both sin-
gle-member constituencies and party 
lists. One thing, however, is already 
certain: the opposition needs to field a 
single candidate to challenge Fidesz in 
all 106 single-member constituencies. 
Whether the opposition should field 
a joint party list or run separately is 
still up for debate. Besides, opposition 
parties are still very far from finding a 
The myth of  
Fidesz’s invincibility 
is broken
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leader who could challenge Viktor Or-
bán as a candidate for prime minister.
Moreover, over the next two and a half 
years, the opposition parties will face 
increasing pressure from both the rul-
ing party and their own corruption-re-
lated temptations, challenging them to 
maintain their coherence. Initial signs 
of fragmentation are already visible as 
a result of the Socialist Party bring-
ing some doubtful figures of the 2000s 
back into local government positions. 
It also remains to be seen, how the rul-
ing party will treat cities led by the 
opposition. The Orbán government 
may well opt to use solid, demonstra-
tive financial pressure against oppo-
sition-led cities – not only depriving 
them of resources from the central 
budget, but also making it hard for 
them to access EU funds. Making op-
position-led cities fail or underper-
form is a strategy that could aim to 
demotivate and deter potential oppo-
sition voters by showing them the neg-
ative effects of moving against the rul-
ing party. Meanwhile, the election of 
Gergely Karácsony as lord mayor of 
Budapest paves the way for closer co-
operation among the four Visegrad 
capitals; Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava, 
and Budapest are now all led by liberal 
mayors. Perhaps they will bypass their 
national governments to jointly lobby 
for receiving EU funds directly.
Against this background – and because 
Budapest and the major cities under 
opposition control have a combined 
population of approximately three mil-
lion – it is highly likely that the upcom-
ing years will see increasing polariza-
tion and near-permanent campaigning 
in Hungarian domestic politics.
